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THE BERRY PARADOX
G. J. Chaitin, IBM Research Division,
P. O. Box 704, Yorktown Heights, NY
10598, USA, chaitin @ watson.ibm.com
Lecture given Wednesday 27 October 1993 at a Physics – Computer
Science Colloquium at the University of New Mexico. The lecture was
videotaped; this is an edited transcript. It also incorporates remarks
made at the Limits to Scientific Knowledge meeting held at the Santa
Fe Institute 24–26 May 1994.
In early 1974, I was visiting the Watson Research Center and I got
the idea of calling Go¨del on the phone. I picked up the phone and
called and Go¨del answered the phone. I said, “Professor Go¨del, I’m
fascinated by your incompleteness theorem. I have a new proof based
on the Berry paradox that I’d like to tell you about.” Go¨del said, “It
doesn’t matter which paradox you use.” He had used a paradox called
the liar paradox. I said, “Yes, but this suggests to me an information-
theoretic view of incompleteness that I would very much like to tell you
about and get your reaction.” So Go¨del said, “Send me one of your
papers. I’ll take a look at it. Call me again in a few weeks and I’ll see
if I give you an appointment.”
I had had this idea in 1970, and it was 1974. So far I had only pub-
lished brief abstracts. Fortunately I had just gotten the galley proofs
of my first substantial paper on this subject. I put these in an envelope
and mailed them to Go¨del.
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2I called Go¨del again and he gave me an appointment! As you can
imagine I was delighted. I figured out how to go to Princeton by train.
The day arrived and it had snowed and there were a few inches of snow
everywhere. This was certainly not going to stop me from visiting
Go¨del! I was about to leave for the train and the phone rang and it
was Go¨del’s secretary. She said that Go¨del was very careful about his
health and because of the snow he wasn’t coming to the Institute that
day and therefore my appointment was canceled.
And that’s how I had two phone conversations with Go¨del but never
met him. I never tried again.
I’d like to tell you what I would have told Go¨del. What I wanted to
tell Go¨del is the difference between what you get when you study the
limits of mathematics the way Go¨del did using the paradox of the liar,
and what I get using the Berry paradox instead.
What is the paradox of the liar? Well, the paradox of the liar is
“This statement is false!”
Why is this a paradox? What does “false” mean? Well, “false” means
“does not correspond to reality.” This statement says that it is false.
If that doesn’t correspond to reality, it must mean that the statement
is true, right? On the other hand, if the statement is true it means
that what it says corresponds to reality. But it says that it is false.
Therefore the statement must be false. So whether you assume that
it’s true or false you then conclude the opposite! So this is the paradox
of the liar.
Now let’s look at the Berry paradox. First of all, why “Berry”?
Well it has nothing to do with fruit! This paradox was published at the
beginning of this century by Bertrand Russell. Now there’s a famous
paradox which is called Russell’s paradox and this is not it! This is
another paradox that he published. I guess people felt that if you
just said the Russell paradox and there were two of them it would be
confusing. And Bertrand Russell when he published this paradox had
a footnote saying that it was suggested to him by Mr G. G. Berry. So it
ended up being called the Berry paradox even though it was published
by Russell.
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Here is a version of the Berry paradox:
“the first positive integer that cannot
be specified in less than a billion words”.
This is a phrase in English that specifies a particular positive integer.
Which positive integer? Well, there are an infinity of positive integers,
but there are only a finite number of words in English. Therefore,
if you have a billion words, there’s only going to be a finite number
of possibilities. But there’s an infinite number of positive integers.
Therefore most positive integers require more than a billion words, and
let’s just take the first one. But wait a second. By definition this integer
is supposed to take a billion words to specify, but I just specified it using
much less than a billion words! That’s the Berry paradox.
What does one do with these paradoxes? Let’s take a look again at
the liar paradox:
“This statement is false!”
The first thing that Go¨del does is to change it from “This statement is
false” to “This statement is unprovable”:
“This statement is unprovable!”
What do we mean by “unprovable”?
In order to be able to show that mathematical reasoning has limits
you’ve got to say very precisely what the axioms and methods of reason-
ing are that you have in mind. In other words, you have to specify how
mathematics is done with mathematical precision so that it becomes
a clear-cut question. Hilbert put it this way: The rules should be so
clear, that if somebody gives you what they claim is a proof, there is
a mechanical procedure that will check whether the proof is correct or
not, whether it obeys the rules or not. This proof-checking algorithm
is the heart of this notion of a completely formal axiomatic system.
So “This statement is unprovable” doesn’t mean unprovable in a
vague way. It means unprovable when you have in mind a specific
formal axiomatic system FAS with its mechanical proof-checking algo-
rithm. So there is a subscript:
“This statement is unprovableFAS !”
4And the particular formal axiomatic system that Go¨del was inter-
ested in dealt with 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and addition and multiplication, that
was what it was about. Now what happens with “This statement is
unprovable”? Remember the liar paradox:
“This statement is false!”
But here
“This statement is unprovableFAS !”
the paradox disappears and we get a theorem. We get incompleteness,
in fact. Why?
Consider “This statement is unprovable”. There are two possibili-
ties: either it’s provable or it’s unprovable.
If “This statement is unprovable” turns out to be unprovable within
the formal axiomatic system, that means that the formal axiomatic
system is incomplete. Because if “This statement is unprovable” is
unprovable, then it’s a true statement. Then there’s something true
that’s unprovable which means that the system is incomplete. So that
would be bad.
What about the other possibility? What if
“This statement is unprovableFAS !”
is provable? That’s even worse. Because if this statement is provable
“This statement is unprovableFAS !”
and it says of itself that it’s unprovable, then we’re proving something
that’s false.
So Go¨del’s incompleteness result is that if you assume that only
true theorems are provable, then this
“This statement is unprovableFAS !”
is an example of a statement that is true but unprovable.
But wait a second, how can a statement deny that it is provable?
In what branch of mathematics does one encounter such statements?
Go¨del cleverly converts this
“This statement is unprovableFAS !”
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into an arithmetical statement, a statement that only involves 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, and addition and multiplication. How does he do this?
The idea is called go¨del numbering. We all know that a string of
characters can also be thought of as a number. Characters are either
8 or 16 bits in binary. Therefore, a string of N characters is either 8N
or 16N bits, and it is also the base-two notation for a large positive
integer. Thus every mathematical statement in this formal axiomatic
system
“This statement is unprovableFAS←−!”
is also a number. And a proof, which is a sequence of steps, is also a
long character string, and therefore is also a number. Then you can
define this very funny numerical relationship between two numbers X
and Y which is that X is the go¨del number of a proof of the statement
whose go¨del number is Y . Thus
“This statement is unprovableFAS !”
ends up looking like a very complicated numerical statement.
There is another serious difficulty. How can this statement refer to
itself? Well you can’t directly put the go¨del number of this statement
inside this statement, it’s too big to fit! But you can do it indirectly.
This is how Go¨del does it: The statement doesn’t refer to itself directly.
It says that if you perform a certain procedure to calculate a number,
this is the go¨del number of a statement which cannot be proved. And it
turns out that the number you calculate is precisely the go¨del number
of the entire statement
“This statement is unprovableFAS !”
That is how Go¨del proves his incompleteness theorem.
What happens if you start with this
“the first positive integer that cannot
be specified in less than a billion words”
instead? Everything has a rather different flavor. Let’s see why.
The first problem we’ve got here is what does it mean to specify a
number using words in English?—this is very vague. So instead let’s
6use a computer. Pick a standard general-purpose computer, in other
words, pick a universal Turing machine (UTM). Now the way you spec-
ify a number is with a computer program. When you run this computer
program on your UTM it prints out this number and halts. So a pro-
gram is said to specify a number, a positive integer, if you start the
program running on your standard UTM, and after a finite amount of
time it prints out one and only one great big positive integer and it
says “I’m finished” and halts.
Now it’s not English text measured in words, it’s computer programs
measured in bits. This is what we get. It’s
“the first positive integer that cannot
be specifiedUTM by a computer program
with less than a billion bits”.
By the way the computer program must be self-contained. If it has any
data, the data is included in the program as a constant.
Next we have to do what Go¨del did when he changed “This state-
ment is false” into “This statement is unprovable.” So now it’s
“the first positive integer that can be provedFAS
to have the property that it cannot
be specifiedUTM by a computer program
with less than a billion bits”.
And to make things clearer let’s replace “a billion bits” by “N bits”.
So we get:
“the first positive integer that can be provedFAS
to have the property that it cannot
be specifiedUTM by a computer program
with less than N bits”.
The interesting fact is that there is a computer program
log2N + cFAS
bits long for calculating this number that supposedly cannot be calcu-
lated by any program that is less than N bits long. And
log2N + cFAS
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is much much smaller than N for all sufficiently large N ! Thus for
such N our FAS cannot enable us to exhibit any numbers that require
programs more than N bits long. This is my information-theoretic
incompleteness result that I wanted to discuss with Go¨del.
Why is there a program that is
log2N + cFAS
bits long for calculating
“the first positive integer that can be provedFAS
to have the property that it cannot
be specifiedUTM by a computer program
with less than N bits” ?
Well here is how you do it.
You start running through all possible proofs in the formal ax-
iomatic system in size order. You apply the proof-checking algorithm
to each proof. And after filtering out all the invalid proofs, you search
for the first proof that a particular positive integer requires at least an
N -bit program.
The algorithm that I’ve just described is very slow but it is very
simple. It’s basically just the proof-checking algorithm, which is cFAS
bits long, and the number N , which is log2N bits long. So the total
number of bits is, as was claimed, just
log2N + cFAS .
That concludes the proof of my incompleteness result that I wanted to
discuss with Go¨del.
Over the years I’ve continued to do research on my information-
theoretic approach to incompleteness. Here are the three most dramatic
results that I’ve obtained:
1) Call a program “elegant” if no smaller program produces the same
output. You can’t prove that a program is elegant. More pre-
cisely, N bits of axioms are needed to prove that an N -bit pro-
gram is elegant.
82) Consider the binary representation of the halting probability Ω.
Ω is the probability that a program chosen at random halts. You
can’t prove what the bits of Ω are. More precisely, N bits of
axioms are needed to determine N bits of Ω.
3) I have constructed a perverse algebraic equation
P (K,X, Y, Z, . . .) = 0.
Vary the parameter K and ask whether this equation has finitely
or infinitely many whole-number solutions. In each case this turns
out to be equivalent to determining individual bits of Ω. There-
fore N bits of axioms are needed to be able to settle N cases.
These striking examples show that sometimes you have to put more
into a set of axioms in order to get more out. (2) and (3) are extreme
cases. They are accidental mathematical assertions that are true for
no reason. In other words, the questions considered in (2) and (3) are
irreducible; essentially the only way to prove them is to add them as
new axioms. Thus in this extreme case you get out of a set of axioms
only what you put in.
How do I prove these incompleteness results (1), (2) and (3)? As
before, the basic idea is the paradox of “the first positive integer that
cannot be specified in less than a billion words.” For (1) the connection
with the Berry paradox is obvious. For (2) and (3) it was obvious to me
only in the case where one is talking about determining the first N bits
of Ω. In the case where the N bits of Ω are scattered about, my original
proof of (2) and (3) (the one given in my Cambridge University Press
monograph) is decidedly not along the lines of the Berry paradox. But a
few years later I was happy to discover a new and more straight-forward
proof of (2) and (3) that is along the lines of the Berry paradox!
In addition to working on incompleteness, I have also devoted a
great deal of thought to the central idea that can be extracted from my
version of the Berry paradox, which is to define the program-size com-
plexity of something to be the size in bits of the smallest program that
calculates it. I have developed a general theory dealing with program-
size complexity that I call algorithmic information theory (AIT).
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AIT is an elegant theory of complexity, perhaps the most developed
of all such theories, but as von Neumann said, pure mathematics is easy
compared to the real world! AIT provides the correct complexity con-
cept for metamathematics, but it is not the correct complexity concept
for physics, biology, or economics.
Program-size complexity in AIT is analogous to entropy in statis-
tical mechanics. Just as thermodynamics gives limits on heat engines,
AIT gives limits on formal axiomatic systems.
I have recently reformulated AIT.
Up to now, the best version of AIT studied the size of programs in
a computer programming language that was not actually usable. Now
I obtain the correct program-size complexity measure from a powerful
and easy to use programming language. This language is a version of
LISP, and I have written an interpreter for it in C. A summary of this
new work is available as IBM Research Report RC 19553 “The limits
of mathematics,” which I am expanding into a book.
So this is what I would have liked to discuss with Go¨del, if I could
speak with him now. Of course this is impossible! But thank you very
much for giving me the opportunity to tell you about these ideas!
Questions for Future Research
• Find questions in algebra, topology and geometry that are equiv-
alent to determining bits of Ω.
• What is an interesting or natural mathematical question?
• How often is such a question independent of the usual axioms? (I
suspect the answer is “Quite often!”)
• Show that a classical open question in number theory such as
the Riemann hypothesis is independent of the usual axioms. (I
suspect that this is often the case, but that it cannot be proven.)
• Should we take incompleteness seriously or is it a red herring? (I
believe that we should take incompleteness very seriously indeed.)
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• Is mathematics quasi-empirical? In other words, should mathe-
matics be done more like physics is done? (I believe the answer
to both questions is “Yes.”)
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